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Abstract
The theory underlying the eÆect of debt structure on the probability of a currency
crisis and the slope of the yield curve was developed in Benigno and Missale (2004).
In this paper, we provide the empirical evidence to support their model’s predictions.
In a dynamic panel data framework we produce GMM estimates that give substantial
support to the hypothesis that the role of short-term debt depends on how a devalu-
ation aÆects the reputation of the policymaker and the real value of public debt. In
addition to the empirical analysis, we generalize the theoretical framework to allow
for the presence of non-deflatable debt and, for completeness, examine the case where
the monetary authority can fully commit itself to an escape clause monetary rule.
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1 Introduction
The mainstream literature on the monetary authority credibility (see Backus and Dri±ll,
1985 and Backus and Dri±ll, 1985b) argues that a defence of the fixed parity can signal the
authority’s ‘toughness’ towards inflation and thus improve the credibility of the exchange
rate regime. A more recent literature has re-examined this issue in the context of a
model economy in which there are persistence eÆects from failing to devalue following an
adverse supply eÆect. For example, in Drazen and Masson (1994) there is persistence
in unemployment and defending the fixed parity leads to higher future unemployment
undermining the possibility that the currency peg will be maintained.1 In Benigno and
Missale (2004) –henceforth BM– persistence is driven not by unemployment, but by debt.
In both models if the degree of uncertainty about the government’s preferences is low,
resisting a currency crisis may in fact reduce the credibility of the exchange rate regime.
In this paper, we adopt BM’s framework and produce new empirical work in order to see
whether a result obtained for an EMS participant also generalises to emerging markets.
Following BM’s approach, we employ a three-period stochastic version of the Barro
and Gordon (1983) model, where the probability of devaluation in each period is derived
from the monetary authority’s optimization problem. Monetary policy is conducted in
terms of an escape clause that specifies the threshold value of a negative supply-side
shock above which devaluation will occur. We present a more general framework than
BM for studying the policymaker’s optimization problem that distinguishes between the
commitment and discretionary optimal escape clauses. We also extend BM’s model to
allow for non-deflatable debt, i.e., in addition to nominal debt the government issues
securities whose real returns cannot be eroded through an unexpected devaluation.
First, we examine the complete information game where the central bank can commit
itself to a 2-period escape clause rule. Minimization of the bank’s loss function delivers the
optimum solution, which we regard as a benchmark. Then, still in a complete information
1Drazen and Masson (1994) explain the apparently paradoxical result that defending the parity may
increase the likelihood of a future devaluation with an enlightening and entertaining example. We recom-
mend referring to the original article, but for the convenience of the reader we summarise it here as well.
In this example a colleague is assumed to announce that in an eÆort to lose weight he is planning to skip
dinner. He then adds that as part of his dieting strategy he has not eaten for two days. Had he not avoided
consuming food for two days the credibility of his announcement would be judged on its merits. But with
several meals skipped one would expect the likelihood that he will eventually eat tonight to be greater.
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game, we move to the case of discretionary policy where the monetary authority cannot
commit. In both cases, with debt consisting of short-term (1-period) and long-term (2-
period) components, it is shown that defending the fixed parity increases the debt burden
and, thus the probability of having to resort to future devaluation. However, this increase
in probability is less under commitment and disappears altogether as debt becomes entirely
short-term. This is the debt burden eÆect. We also confirm the BM result for discretionary
policy that, the probability of a first-period devaluation also increases with the level of
public debt and, more interestingly, with the share of short-term debt. Comparison with
the commitment case shows that the discretionary two-period escape clause rules are sub-
optimal and involve an expected inflation bias. This can be lessened by the delegation of
monetary policy to a ‘tough’ (inflation-averse) banker, but this relocates the problem to
one of establishing the credibility of such toughness.
This leads us to an asymmetric information game where the authority’s preferences are
not known to the private sector. The decision to devalue might reveal a weak monetary
authority, thus leading to inflationary expectations which in turn, increase the likelihood
of a future devaluation. This is the signalling eÆect and this eÆect is important when there
is substantial uncertainty about the authority’s cost of devaluation and total debt is small.
Whether the debt burden or the signalling eÆect prevails depends on the importance of
debt fundamentals relative to the extent of the authority’s credibility (signalling) problem.
We focus on three key predictions of the theory. The first is that if the debt burden
eÆect dominates the signalling eÆect then defending the fixed parity increases the debt
burden and, thus the probability of having to resort to future devaluation. Second, in
debt burden countries the likelihood of a first-period devaluation increases with the share
of short-term debt, as the incentive to devalue and exploit the lower rate (which follows the
devaluation) also increases with the amount of debt to be rolled-over. On the other hand,
when the uncertainty about the authority type is substantial, a lower interest rate results
from the decision not to devalue. In that case, the probability of a first-period devaluation
decreases with the proportion of short-term debt. The third prediction regards the slope of
the yield curve over the two periods. The theory shows that the probability of a second-
period devaluation seen at the beginning of period 1 does not depend on either debt
maturity or credibility considerations. Therefore in debt burden (signalling) countries, a
2
higher ratio of short-term debt implies a flatter (steeper) yield curve.
Since the extent of a country’s credibility problem is not directly observed we cannot
hope to test all three predictions. Instead, we assume that the first prediction is true and
use the experience of countries following a successful defence of fixed exchange rate regime
to separate countries where the debt burden or signalling eÆects are dominant. We use
the Reinhart and RogoÆ (2004) index to define the actual changes in the exchange rate
regime for 10 emerging economies from 1993Q3 to 2001Q4 and construct a market pressure
index in order to identify periods of high pressure in foreign exchange (FX) markets. We
then proceed to identify observations where FX market pressure is accommodated (i.e.
there is a shift in the regime) and where it is not. Countries where the debt burden
eÆect dominates are subsequently distinguished from others where the signalling eÆect
prevails, based on the behaviour of market expectations following successful defences or
actual regime shifts. The theory’s main predictions about the impact of debt maturity on
the likelihood of crisis and the yield curve are then tested in a dynamic panel framework.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out an open-economy stochastic
Barro-Gordon model with short-term and long-term debt. Section 3 examines three cases:
commitment and non-commitment with symmetric and asymmetric information. Section
4 presents the empirics and section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a three-period open economy of the Barro-Gordon model where the un-
expected inflation that follows a devaluation increases output both through a standard
price-output eÆect and through a tax-reduction eÆect. As in BM, Obstfeld (1994) and
Velasco (1996), we assume that taxes are only levied in the last period and they involve
an output cost. These tax distortions increase the incentive to devalue. Following the
escape clauses approach of Obstfeld (1997), we assume that output is stochastic to take
into account that even a tough policymaker, with a high aversion to inflation, will devalue
if the economy is hit by unusually large shocks. We also take the size of a devaluation as
given, i.e. independent of the magnitude of the shock, so the authority’s choice is between
maintaining a fixed parity or a devaluation of a fixed size.
Assuming Purchasing Power Parity and taking the foreign sector as given, it follows
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that the inflation rate ºt, in periods t = 1, 2 equals the rate of devaluation. Therefore, the
output in period 1 is given by
y1 = y§ + Æ(º1 °E0º1)° k ° u1 (1)
where y§ is the target output, º1°E0º1 is inflation surprise, k is a goods or labour market
distortion and u1 is a supply shock. Under our assumptions, ºt = 0 when authority
maintains fixed parity and ºt = d when authority devalues. Thus, the equilibrium level of
output under perfect foresight (no shocks) is y§ ° k, which is considered to be too low by
the authority. The output in period 2 is given by
y2 = y§ + Æ(º2 ° E1º2)° k ° T ° u2 (2)
where T is the output cost of distortionary taxation required to repay debt B = B10+B20,
where B10 is the one-period (short-term) real debt and B20 is then two-period (long-term)
real debt issued in period 0.
Consider accumulated short-term and long-term debt, B1t and B2t respectively, at
the end of periods t = 1, 2. Let rt be the real interest rate in period t given by rt =
∂t ° ºt to a linear approximation. For nominal inflation-sensitive short-term debt, ∂t =
Et°1rt + Et°1ºt, is the nominal interest rate at the beginning of period t demanded by
the private sector to achieve an expected real interest rate of Et°1rt. Therefore, rt =
Et°1rt°(ºt°Et°1ºt) = r§°(ºt°Et°1ºt) where we assume Et°1rt = r§, the fixed foreign
real interest rate. Similarly for long-term debt rt = r§ ° (ºt ° E0ºt). Let µ 2 [0, 1] be
the proportion of inflation-sensitive debt2. Assuming r§ = 0 for convenience, the levels of
short-term and long-term debt at the end of period 2 are given, respectively, by
B12 = [1° µ(º1 ° E0º1)° µ(º2 ° E1º2)]B10
B22 = [1° µ(º1 ° E0º1)° µ(º2 ° E0º2)]B20 (3)
At the end of period 2, taxes T must be levied to repay the accumulated debt, B12+B22.
2See Mandilaras and Levine (2001) for the role of inflation expectations in the determination of inflation-
sensitive debt.
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Assuming the eÆect on output to be proportional to debt we then have that T = ø(B12+
B22). Normalizing ø = 1 (which implies that debt itself is measured in terms of output
loss), using (3) and substituting into (2) yields
y2 ° y§ = (º2 °E0º2)m+ (º1 ° E0º1)µB ° (E1º2 ° E0º2)S °K ° u2 (4)
where B = B10 + B20 as before, is the real value of total debt at period 0, m = Æ + µB,
S = Æ + µB10 and K = k + B is the expected deviation of output from target. Our
basic model is then given by (1) and (4). The output eÆect of a revision in expectations
depends on S = Æ+ µB10, which increases with short-term inflation-sensitive debt, µB10.
If a devaluation leads to an upward revision in the interest rate, then the authority is
worse oÆ the shorter the maturity of its debt (the higher S), because short-term debt is
refinanced at higher-than-expected interest rates.
At t = 0, the authority of type i = W (Weak), T (Tough) is assumed to minimize an
intertemporal loss function:
≠i0 = E
i
0[L
i
1 + ØL
i
2] (5)
where E0 denotes expectations conditional on the information in period 0, 0 < Ø < 1 is
the discount factor and Lit is a single-period loss function in which the authority weighs
the cost of devaluation against the output deviation from the target y§:
Lit = µ
iº2t + (yt ° y§)2 ; t = 1, 2 (6)
where µi measures the cost of devaluation relative to output for type i and µW < µT . From
our model, we have that Li1 and Li2 are functions:
Li1 = L
i
1(º1, E0º1, u1) ; L
i
2 = L
i
2(º1, E0º1,º2, E0º2, E1º2, u2)
(in addition to fixed parameters k, y§, B10 and B20) since in period 2 taxes T are repaid.
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3 Solving the Model
3.1 Commitment under Complete Information
This section assumes complete information and presents a more general framework than
BM that distinguishes between the cases where the monetary authority can commit itself
to some predefined rules, and where it cannot commit and thus pursues a discretionary
policy. In this sub-section, we first set out this general framework and then we consider
the commitment case.
The two-period expected loss function in period 0 can be rewritten as
§0 = E0(L1) + Ø[Ω1E0L2(D) + (1° Ω1)E0L2(F )] (7)
where Ω1 = probability of a first-period devaluation and L2(h) is the welfare loss in period 2
following a history h = D(Devaluation), F (maintaining the Fixed parity). In what follows
we consider Ω1 and the probability of a second-period devaluation at the end of period 1,
Ω2(h), to be instruments chosen by the monetary authority to minimize its loss. As we
will see, this is equivalent to choosing a threshold uˆ1 in the first period for the magnitude
of negative supply-side shock at which the monetary authority devalues, and a state-
contingent shock uˆ2, in the second period, which depends on the realization of uˆ1 in
period 1. Under complete information, the type of the monetary authority is known to
the private sector so we suppress the type superscript in this and the next sub-section to
ease the notation.
The sequence of events under commitment is as follows. At period 0, the fiscal author-
ity issues fixed-rate one-period (short-term) and two-period (long-term) bonds, including
debts denominated in a foreign currency. Given this debt structure, the monetary author-
ity commits itself to the two-period rule consisting of probability of devaluation in period
1, Ω1 and in period 2, Ω2(h), h = D,F following a history h = D,F in period 1. The in-
terest rates of the debts are determined by (rational) expectation of inflation rates (rates
of devaluation). Then in periods 1 and 2 shocks occur and the authority implements this
commitment rule to devalue or maintain the parity. At the end of period 1 the one-period
debt is rolled over and at the end of period 2 the total debt service is repaid by levying
distortionary taxes.
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Proposition 1. Under commitment, the probability of a devaluation in period 2 following
a fixed parity in period 1, Ω2(F ), is the same as that following a devaluation, Ω2(D) if there
is no long-term debt. As the proportion of long-term debt increases, then Ω2(F )°Ω2(D) > 0
and increases. If there is any long-term debt, then Ω2(F )° Ω2(D) > 0 also increases with
total debt. (See the Appendix for proof.)
The intuition behind this result is as follows. The central bank when committing to Ω1,
Ω2(D), Ω2(F ) implies a commitment to the first-period nominal interest rate (equal to Ω1d)
and the second-period nominal interest rate following first-period devaluation (D) or not
(F), equal to Ω2(D)d and Ω2(F )d respectively. This is also confirmed by our prerequisites
that the realization of the shocks, as well as the monetary authority’s decision to devalue
or not, are publicly observed under complete information. If there is only short-term
debt, then any actions taken by the authority in period 1 (devalue or not) do not have
any impact on how the short-term debt is rolled over at end of that period as everything
has been defined in the commitment. Therefore, Ω2(D) = Ω2(F ). However, if there
is any long-term debt, then a first period devaluation that follows a su±ciently large
negative supply-side shock will erode some of this debt and thereby reduce the need to
erode more in the second period. In an intertemporal optimization at time t = 0, the
policymaker with commitment takes this fully into account with the result that, in the
second-period, the history-contingent probabilities chosen at time t = 0 have the property
that Ω2(D) < Ω2(F ).
3.2 Discretion under Complete Information
The sequence of events under discretion is now as follows. At period 0, the private sector
forms expectations about inflation in periods 1 and 2, which determine the fixed interest
rates of the one-period (short-term) and two-period (long-term) bond issues respectively.
In period 1, after the realization of the output shock, the monetary authority decides
whether to devalue or maintain the fixed parity. At the end of period 1, the one-period
debt is rolled over at the interest rate that is determined by the revision of the private
sector’s expectation of second-period inflation. In period 2, after the realization of a
second shock, the authority decides whether to devalue and finally repays the debt by
levying distortional taxes. The game tree for this sequence of events is given in Figure 1.
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Nature
Weak(W) Tough (T)
Monetary authority chooses debt maturity
F D F D
F D F DF D F D
Monetary authority devalues or maintains
fixed parity following a shock
Monetary authority devalues or maintains
fixed parity following a shock, then repays debt
[period 0]
[period 1]
[period 2]
Private sector observes decision
Figure 1: The Game Tree under Discretion.
Proposition 2. Under complete information and discretion, the probability of a devalua-
tion in period 2 following a fixed parity in period 1, Ω2(F ), is greater than that following a
devaluation, Ω2(D) irrespective of the composition of debt. The diÆerence Ω2(F ) ° Ω2(D)
is greater under discretion than under commitment. (See the Appendix for proof.)
A first-period devaluation causes unexpected inflation, which reduces the real debt
burden and thus the expected deviation of second-period output from target. Devaluation
also aÆects the probability of a devaluation in period 2 through a downside revision in
expectations and hence a lower-than-expected interest rate at which the short-term debt
is rolled over. Thus, a devaluation in period 1 reduces the likelihood of a second-period
crisis.
As shown in proposition 1, in the commitment case with complete information, short-
term debt cannot act as a channel whereby the first-period devaluation decreases the
likelihood of a second-period crisis. In other words, whether the authority devalues in
period 1 or not does not aÆect the probability of a devaluation in period 2 if B = B10.
But in the case of discretion, current devaluation can ease the debt burden for the future;
the short-term debt is crucial to this eÆect since the benefits of first-period devaluation
are magnified by the amount of debt that is rolled over. On the one hand, ¢ΩC2 does not
depend on B10 while on the other hand, a rise in B10 increases the diÆerence Ω2(F )°Ω2(D)
in the discretion case. Therefore, ¢ΩD2 is greater than ¢ΩC2 as long as there exists some
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short-term debt.
Proposition 3. Under complete information and discretion, the probability of a first-
period crisis increases with the share of short-term debt B10 and with the volume of
inflation-sensitive debt, µB. (See the Appendix for proof.)
The eÆect of a history of devaluation or maintaining the fixed rate in period 1 on the
probability of a crisis in period 2 depends on the term S = Æ + µB10, which increases
with short-term debt B10. A higher proportion of short-term debt makes maintaining the
fixed parity in the first period more costly leading to a greater chance that the monetary
authority might choose to devalue in period 1. The intuition for that is that more short-
term debt makes the inflation rate, which is expected after maintaining the parity, higher
while making inflation expected after a devaluation lower. In other words, long-term debt
can minimize the probability of an exchange-rate devaluation in the first period when the
monetary authority’s preferences are known to the market.
These results yield testable predictions regarding the yield curve (E0º1, E0º2). As can
be shown from (A-28), the expected second-period inflation rate increases with the total
volume of debt, B, and with the proportion of inflation-sensitive debt µ, but is independent
of its maturity structure. Combined with the previous proposition we then have:
Proposition 4. The expected second-period inflation rate increases with the total volume
of debt and the ratio of inflation-sensitive debt, but is independent of its maturity struc-
ture. Together with proposition 3 this implies that in the discretion case under complete
information, the yield curve becomes flatter as the proportion of short-term debt increases.
3.3 Discretion under Asymmetric Information
We now consider the case where monetary policy is conducted by a monetary authority
with preferences unknown to the public. We assume there are two possible types of
authorities: a ‘tough’ authority with a relatively high weight on inflation in (6) µ = µT ,
and a ‘weak’ authority with preference parameter µW < µT . As discussed above, one
interpretation of this asymmetric information is that the authority with preference µ = µT
delegate to an independent ‘conservative’ banker in the RogoÆ-sense with µT > µW , but
the credibility of this central bank independence from the authority needs to be tested by
the public in a process of Bayesian learning.
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The solution to the discretion case under asymmetric information follows the complete
information case, proceeding by backwards induction starting in period 2 but with the
following changes: the probabilities of devaluation Ωi1, Ωi2(D), Ωi2(F ), i = T,W are now
type-dependent; in periods t = 0, 1, 2, the private sector attaches a probability qt that
the authority is tough (i.e., µ = µT ) and a probability 1 ° qt that it is weak (µ = µW );
in period 0 the private sector has a prior q0 which is up-dated at the end of each of the
following two periods observing devaluation D or a maintenance of the fixed exchange
rate F and the realization of output shocks ut, t = 1, 2 occurring during the period. It is
also assumed that the debt maturity is the same for both types of authorities and so are
their interest rates, E0º1 and E0º2. Then, following the first-period shock, each type of
monetary authority will decide to devalue or not taking into account the impact of this
decision on the beliefs of the private sector entering period 2.
Proposition 5. Under discretion and asymmetric information, the credibility of the ex-
change regime is increased by a successful defense if and only if the diÆerence between
preferences, µT ° µW , is large relative to the level of deflatable debt, µB. Moreover, the
diÆerence in probabilities Ω2(F \ u1)° Ω2(D \ u1) is less than that under complete infor-
mation owing to the signalling eÆect which depends on the degree of uncertainty µT ° µW .
(See the Appendix for proof.)
This result follows because reputation considerations provide both type of authorities
with an incentive to defend the exchange rate—for a tough authority to signal its type,
and for a weak one in order to pretend to be tough. The greater the diÆerence in the
authority’s preferences µT ° µW is, the stronger is the incentive.
3.3.1 Separating Equilibrium and Short-term Debt
The characterization of the possible equilibria when the private sector can make inferences
observing the authority’s actions, and the shock is rather complicated involving pooling or
separating equilibria depending on the realization of u1. Here, we follow the simplifying
assumption of Drazen and Masson (1994) and assume that the realization of the shock u1
cannot be inferred by the private sector at the beginning of period 2 (for example, as a
result of the delayed publication of output data). Then the equilibrium is separating in
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strategies with the two types choosing diÆerent probabilities of devaluation in period 1
and history-dependent probabilities in period 2 given by (A-36) and (A-38) respectively.
Note that this assumption does not imply that the tough authority will never devalue
or that a weak authority always devalues. In fact, both types of authorities will choose to
devalue if the economy is hit by shocks that exceed their respective threshold levels and
similarly neither will devalue if shocks are small. But since these shocks are not observed
by the private sector, the equilibrium, although separating in shock-dependent strategies,
does not reveal the type of policymaker with certainty.3
Proposition 6. In the case of discretion under asymmetric information, the probability
of a first-period devaluation increases with the proportion of short-term debt if the debt
burden eÆect dominates. If the signalling eÆect dominates, the probability decreases with
the proportion of short-term debt. Both eÆects are magnified by the volume of inflation-
sensitive debt, µB. (See the Appendix for proof.)
The reason why a short maturity of debt is crucial to the signalling eÆect is that it can
bolster market confidence that the parity will be maintained. In this case, an increase in
short-maturity debt –i.e. a larger µB10– compels the monetary authority to resist a crisis
in order to avoid rolling over the debt at a new higher interest rate. That is because a
first-period devaluation increases market expectations of a second-period devaluation (and
thus the interest rate) when the signaling eÆect dominates. However, when there is little
uncertainty about the authority’s preferences, the probability of a first-period devaluation
increases with short-term debt, as it does under complete information.
Hence, together with (A-40) we have
Proposition 7. If the uncertainty about the authority’s type is substantial, a higher ratio
of short-term debt implies a lower short-term interest rate and a steeper yield curve as the
forward rate keeps constant. On the other hand, when there is little uncertainty about the
authority’s preferences, a short maturity leads to a higher current interest rate and thus a
flatter yield curve, as in the case of complete information. (See the Appendix for proof.)
3In the analysis of BM shocks are observed by the private sector. Then there are pooling equilibria
where, for low realizations of shocks, both policymakers maintain the parity with probability 1 and, for
large shocks, both devalue with probability 1. There also exists an intermediate range of shocks for which,
in a separating equilibrium, a devaluation by the weak reveals its type and another higher range where
maintaining the parity leads to the conclusion that the type must be tough.
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4 The Empirics
4.1 Data and Methodology
In this section, we explore quantitatively the key predictions of the theory focusing on
the role of short-term debt. We have seen that the eÆects of a successful defence of the
peg on the credibility of the exchange rate regime will depend on whether asymmetric
information or a high debt burden is the government’s biggest problem (see proposition
5). Since we cannot observe asymmetric information directly, categorizing countries in
one group or the other poses a challenge.
We overcome this di±culty in two steps: first, we identify periods of high pressure in
the foreign exchange (FX) market and observe whether they have led to an actual change
in the exchange rate regime. If the regime has remained unaltered following a period
of increased FX pressure we classify the episode as ‘successful defence’; if, on the other
hand, increased FX activity has led to a more flexible regime, we classify the episode as
‘accommodation’.
Second, we check the movement of the interest rate diÆerential with the US following a
successful defence or accommodation. Depending on whether the diÆerential has increased
or decreased we classify the economy as a debt burden or signalling economy. Using this
rather ad hoc but su±ciently realistic classification procedure we are able to test the
remaining two key predictions of the model. Namely, we examine the eÆect of short-term
debt on the likelihood of a first-period devaluation and on the slope of the yield curve.
The methodology employed is that of Arellano and Bond (1992).
The data on the level and structure of debt are from the Bank for International Set-
tlements website. We obtain quarterly observations from the fourth quarter of 1993 to
the third quarter of 2003 for all developing/emerging economies featured in the database:
Argentina, Brazil, the Czech Republic, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Malaysia, Mexico,
Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Thai-
land and Turkey. Data on the rest of the control variables (these include monetary, fiscal
and international liquidity indicators) are from the IMF’s International Financial Statis-
tics. The monthly exchange rate regime index is from Reinhart and RogoÆ (2004); we
convert this to a quarterly index to match the frequency of the dataset. Annual GDP
12
Table 1: Average Values
Countries de
bt
gd
p
ss
td
eb
t
sin
td
eb
t
ir re
sg
dp
ca
ba
lg
dp
qm
on
gd
p
cla
ss
Argentina 24.41 10.69 56.26 7.14 6.76 -0.37 18.98 S*
Brazil 38.06 47.48 6.72 24.39 7.01 -0.01 93.86 DB*
Czech Rep. 29.99 84.35 5.50 7.79 22.35 1.10 162.76 DB*
Hong Kong NA 76.27 NA 5.47 NA NA NA S
Hungary NA 32.24 43.03 17.20 NA NA NA NA
India NA 10.21 NA 9.00 7.89 0.45 NA S
Malaysia 37.20 6.03 8.24 4.06 33.85 0.92 270.34 S*
Mexico 15.86 44.89 28.07 19.66 6.49 0.13 NA DB
Peru NA 100.00 NA 16.14 16.50 0.15 72.20 DB
Philippines 37.53 28.27 15.74 11.12 13.99 0.38 174.38 S*
Poland 21.59 31.93 4.08 19.02 13.19 0.20 97.09 DB*
Russia NA 52.26 26.71 15.37 NA NA NA NA
Singapore NA 43.59 0.98 2.56 NA NA NA DB
South Africa 45.93 15.30 6.03 12.13 3.22 0.36 NA DB
South Korea 13.23 20.12 4.17 8.68 13.34 0.68 190.20 S*
Taiwan NA 9.99 NA 4.98 NA NA NA NA
Thailand 10.34 9.73 30.17 3.47 23.96 0.08 321.06 DB*
Turkey 35.45 46.91 27.92 69.82 10.65 NA NA DB
Notes: All numbers are means (values for ir are medians). Fewer than 10 observations for a variable result in a
NA entry. debtgdp is the sum of domestic debt issued by national governments (taken from BIS, table 16A) plus
international bonds and notes (BIS, table 15B), expressed as a percentage of GDP. sstdebt is the value of domestic
debt securities issued by national governments with remaining maturity up to one year (BIS, table 17), expressed
as a share of domestic government debt. sintdebt is the sum of debt issued by non-residents plus debt issued by
residents if it is in foreign currency or it is targeted at non-residents (BIS, table 15B). ir is the Treasury Bill rate
(or another short-term interest rate if this is not available), resgdp is the value of total reserves minus gold as a
fraction of GDP, cabalgdp is the current account balance as a fraction of GDP and qmongdp is the value of quasi-
money, again as a fraction of GDP. Finally, the last column indicates whether a country is classified as ‘signalling’
or ‘debt-burden’ according to the procedure described later in the text. A (*) indicates that the country is used in
the estimations.
data in US dollars, collected from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank,
were interpolated with cubic splines to produce an approximation of the quarterly series.
Descriptive statistics, along with variable definitions and more details on the debt data
sources are presented in Table 1. Note that as a result of the lack of data on debt and/or
GDP for some of the countries in the dataset the actual estimations were carried out with
a subset of countries.
We employ the diÆerence between the domestic money market interest rate and the
USA fed funds rate to represent the probability of a current crisis as perceived by the
market. This measure follows Drazen and Mason (1994) and BM.4 An approximation of
4It has to be noted that the use of this measure, especially in relevance to emerging economies, is not
13
the yield curve is obtained by dividing the forward interest rate by the current market
interest rate (we use the government long-term bond yield as a proxy for the former).
We gauge pressures in the FX market through the use of a market pressure index
(MPI). The theoretical roots of the index can be found in an analysis of demand and
supply of national currencies in Girton and Roper (1977), where the term “exchange
market pressure” was first used. Here, we use a variation of the Eichengreen et al. (1996)
index. It is calculated as
MPIit = Æi £XRit + Øi £DIRit ° ∞i £RESit.
for country i, where XR is the change in the log of the nominal exchange rate with the
US dollar, IRD is the change in the domestic interest rate, RES is the change in the
logarithm of international reserves excluding gold (in US dollars), and the weights Æ, Ø
and ∞ are determined by calculating
µ
1
sdj
∂
/
µ
1
sdXR
+
1
sdDIR
+
1
sdRES
∂
where j = XR, IRD,RES and sd stands for the standard deviation. Higher values of
the index indicate mounting FX pressures. The next stage of the empirical analysis is to
distinguish between countries depending on whether the debt burden or signalling eÆects
dominate.
4.2 Measuring the Debt Burden and Signalling EÆects
We know from the theory that when there is substantial uncertainty about the govern-
ment’s type, a strenuous defense of the exchange rate can signal the government’s com-
mitment and, as a result, enhance the credibility of the exchange rate regime; but with
the debt burden eÆect prevailing, this policy worsens fundamentals by increasing the real
value of debt, making the economy more vulnerable to adverse shocks in the future.5
entirely innocuous. It is used, however, in the absence of a better alternative.
5Other candidate explanations of why a debt-burden country’s decision to defend the currency in the
face of FX market pressure increases the likelihood of a future devaluation include the possibility that
successfully defending countries may fail to implement institutional reforms in contrast to countries that
have ‘learnt their lesson’ (by unwillingly devaluing). However, in the empirical implementation we confine
ourselves to using the specific predictions of our extension of BM’s theory.
14
The first step in determining the relative importance of the two eÆects for each country
is to identify instances of successful defence or accommodation of FX pressure in the data.
We use the MPI to represent FX market pressure. If an observation exceeds the mean
value plus 1.5 times the standard deviation of a series of a country, then it is classified as
a crisis observation. More succinctly:
Crisis =
8><>:1 if MPI ∏ mean(MPI) + 1.5£ sd(MPI)0 if MPI < mean(MPI) + 1.5£ sd(MPI)
In this way, we construct a binary crisis index for each country in the sample.6 We now
need to observe the reaction of the policymaker to the excess FX pressure. Has there been
a policy change with regard to the exchange rate arrangements (i.e. a ‘softening’ of the
exchange rate regime) or has there been no change at all?
We obtain the required information from Reinhart and RogoÆ (2004) who oÆer a
comprehensive de facto classification of exchange rate regimes.7 We employ their ‘coarse’
index, which registers substantial shifts in the regime –see Table 2. If there is a move
towards a softer regime within the crisis quarter or the next, then we consider the reaction
of the policymaker as accommodating. If the exchange rate regime remains unchanged
then we consider it as successful defence.8
Next, we examine the interest rate diÆerential with the US following a successful de-
fence or accommodation of the pressure. We classify the countries in two groups depending
on the direction of movement of the diÆerential. As indicated in Proposition 5, countries
where the debt burden is more important than signalling will find that a current deval-
uation increases the probability that a future defense of the new parity will succeed. In
other words, we should observe a drop in the market interest rate diÆerential following
accommodation (and a rise following a successful defence).
On the other hand, in countries facing substantial uncertainty over the authority’s
6This is not the only way to classify observations as crisis or non-crisis. A Markov-switching estimation
with two regimes can also determine whether an observation belongs to a ‘crisis’ or ‘non-crisis’ distribution.
The resulting classification is similar to the one we obtain using the above formula.
7Note that the use of this index restricts the time dimension of the data to the fourth quarter of 2001.
8There is only one instance where a crisis is followed by a tightening of the regime. This takes place in
the beginning of the sample for Brazil and we ignore it as it is also accompanied by excessive interest rate
movements.
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Table 2: Classification of Exchange Rate Regimes
Regime Index
No separate legal tender 1
Pre announced peg or currency board arrangement 1
Pre announced horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% 1
De facto peg 1
Pre announced crawling peg 2
Pre announced crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% 2
De facto crawling peg 2
De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% 2
Pre announced crawling band that is wider than or equal to +/-2% 3
De facto crawling band that is wider than or equal to +/-5% 3
Moving band that is wider than or equal to +/-2% 3
Managed floating 3
Freely floating 4
Freely falling 5
Dual market in which parallel market data is missing 6
Source: Reinhart and RogoÆ, 2004.
resolve not to devalue, accommodation of FX pressure would reveal a weak authority
possibly heading towards further devaluations. This generates inflationary expectations
and a higher interest rate diÆerential. In contrast, resisting a crisis enhances the credibility
of the authority and the expectation that the parity will be maintained. Therefore, the
interest rate spread in signalling countries rises after a crisis and drops after a successful
defence.
We implement the classification procedure as follows. Subsequent to a defence or
accommodation incident we define three time windows of two, four and six observations,
respectively. We then compare the average interest rate diÆerentials during these time
windows to the average of the diÆerentials during the corresponding number of quarters
prior to the incident. If the average diÆerential after a successful defence (accommodation)
is higher (lower) compared to its average value before the incident then the country is
classified as debt burden. Otherwise, it is classified as signalling.9 For example, Argentina
experienced high FX pressure in the first quarter of 1995, which was followed by lower
diÆerentials than before the crisis –see Figure 2. As the exchange rate regime did not
9Occasionally, the decision to classify a country as signalling or debt burden is sensitive to the time
window. As an example, the two-quarter horizon may give a conflicting outcome to the six-quarter horizon.
In such cases, we classify the country according to the outcome of the remaining horizon (e.g. the four-
quarter one).
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Figure 2: Argentina, a Signalling Country
change during or shortly after the crisis, the lower diÆerential following the successful
defence indicates that the signalling eÆect prevailed. A few years later in the last quarter
of 2001, there was another crisis, which this time was accommodated, as the peg was
abandoned. The subsequent increase in the interest rate again indicates that the signalling
eÆect dominates the debt burden eÆect.10
This procedure places Argentina, Hong Kong, India, Malaysia, the Philippines and
South Korea in the signalling group and Brazil, the Czech Republic, Mexico, Peru, Poland,
Singapore, South Africa, Thailand and Turkey in the debt burden group.11
4.3 The EÆects of Short-term Debt
When there is little uncertainty over the authority’s preferences and the level of debt is
high, a devaluation leads to a lower interest rate. Thus, the likelihood of a first-period
devaluation increases with the share of short-term debt, as the greater the amount of
short-term debt there is to be rolled over, the greater is the incentive to devalue and
exploit the lower rate. On the other hand, when the uncertainty about the authority type
10Of course, there is nothing in principle that would preclude a country from facing both signalling and
debt burden eÆect episodes. We turn to this issue in the econometric analysis.
11Hungary, Russia and Taiwan cannot be classified, as they have not registered a crisis in the period
1993:Q3–2001:Q4.
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is substantial, a lower interest rate results from the decision not to devalue. In that case,
the probability of a first-period devaluation decreases with the proportion of short-term
debt. Therefore, the eÆect of the debt maturity on the probability of a current devaluation
depends on whether the signaling or the debt burden eÆect prevails (see Proposition 6).12
Equation (A-40) shows that the expected second-period devaluation formed in period
0 is independent of the debt maturity. In other words, the proportion of short-term
debt does not aÆect the forward interest rate, which only depends on fundamentals. The
reputational incentive lowers the short-term interest rate but has no impact on the forward
rate. Therefore, when there is substantial uncertainty about the authority’s preferences,
a higher ratio of short-term debt implies lower current interest rates and a steeper yield
curve. In contrast, if the fundamentals outweigh the reputational considerations, a higher
proportion of short-term debt is associated with higher current interest rates and a flatter
yield curve (see Proposition 7).
Graphs of the debt to GDP ratio, the share of short-term debt and the interest rate
diÆerential for the countries included in the estimations for the signaling and debt-burden
groups are presented in Figures 3 and 4, respectively. Inspection of these figures in con-
junction with the descriptive statistics in Table 1 reveals that on the aggregate level the
two groups do not seem to diÆer in any particular way in terms of the model’s key variables.
The methodology we adopt to test the predictions discussed above is the generalized
method of moments (GMM) for dynamic panel data (see Arellano and Bond, 1991). The
specification is of the form
yit = Æyi(t°1) + x0itØ + ∏i + ≤it (8)
where yit is the dependent variable, x0it is a vector of explanatory variables, ∏i represents
country-specific eÆects and ≤it is a non-autocorrelated error term.
As Arellano and Bond (1991) argue, when ≤it is heteroscedastic, simulations suggest
that the asymptotic standard errors for the two-step estimators can be a poor guide for
hypothesis testing in typical sample sizes. In our case, both the interest rate diÆerential
12Of course, the considerations aÆecting the decision about the maturity structure of public debt are
not exhausted in analyzing its potential eÆects on the government’s reputation and the real value of public
debt. Other factors, like the cost of borrowing in international markets, are likely to play an important
role as well –see, e.g. Broner et al. (2004).
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Figure 3: Signalling Countries – Argentina, Malaysia, Philippines and Korea
and our measure for the yield curve appear to be more volatile during crises compared to
the relatively stable periods. Therefore, we focus on the one-step GMM estimators with
the asymptotic heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors, for which the inference tests
are more reliable.13
The first set of regressions involves the interest rate diÆerential with the US (irdif )
on the left hand-side, as a measure of devaluation expectations. If the market perceives
that the probability of a devaluation has increased, then the diÆerential should rise. The
explanatory variables include the lagged dependent variable, the share of short-term debt
as a fraction of domestic debt (sstdebt), the debt to GDP ration (debtgdp) along with
monetary and international liquidity variables as controls. These include the reserves to
GDP ratio (resgdp), the current account balance as a fraction of GDP (cabalgdp) and
13See Blundell and Bond (1998) for further discussion.
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Figure 4: Debt-burden Countries – Brazil, Czech Republic, Poland and Thailand
the ratio of quasi money to GDP (qmongdp).14 The RHS variables were chosen for their
intuitive relevance and are often cited in the currency crisis literature as important de-
terminants of crises.15 A higher current account deficit and amount of money, as well as
lower international reserves should ceteris paribus lead to a higher domestic interest rate.
The results for the signalling and debt burden groups are shown in the first two columns
of Table 3.
They indicate that in countries where the relative importance of debt is higher than the
14We have not been able to obtain data on foreign currency debt. Instead, we used the share of inter-
national debt (which, in addition, contains domestic currency debt issued by foreign residents or aimed
at foreign residents) as a proxy in the above regressions. The results were either counter-intuitive or
insignificant.
15The currency crisis literature is considerable and a more detailed review would be beyond the scope of
this paper. The role of our chosen control variables in the context of crisis models is examined in several
empirical contributions; see, among others, Sachs et al. (1996), Kaminsky et al. (1998) and Kumar et al.
(2002).
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uncertainty over the authority’s preferences, the probability of a crisis increases with the
ratio of short-term debt. In contrast, in the signalling group, the relationship between the
probability of a crisis and the ratio of short-term debt is negative, as predicted by BM’s
theory. The lagged dependent variable is highly significant in both regressions, indicating
a degree of persistence in the direction of movement of the diÆerential. The debt to GDP
ratio does not appear to have a significant eÆect on the probability of crisis. Reserves
enter the debt burden equation with the right sign but the coe±cients are insignificant.
The current account balance is rightly signed in both equations but is significant only in
the debt burden group. The quasi money variable is incorrectly signed, but significant
only in the signalling group.
Could these results be the outcome of reverse causality? For example, it could be
argued that fears of a devaluation may induce higher holdings of short-term debt by
investors. In the signalling regression this line of argument would predict a positive sign
for sstdebt. However, what we find and report is a negative coe±cient. Hence, there is
strong prima facie evidence that the results for the signalling group capture the eÆects
described in Proposition 6. In the debt burden regression, changes in the expectation of
devaluation will only have an eÆect on newly issued debt, which is a small proportion
of outstanding debt. Even if there is an issue with endogeneity in the levels relationship
the first-diÆerences transformation that has been applied should successfully deal with the
issue.
The second set of regressions has a measure of the term structure of interest rates on
the LHS. We use as a proxy the long-term government bond yield divided by the short-term
(money market) interest rate. We have shown that emerging economies facing substantial
uncertainty about the government’s type should reap lower short-term interest rates when
they show their anti-inflation intentions with a shorter maturity. As the long-term rate
is determined only by fundamentals, these countries should face a steeper yield curve. In
contrast, in countries where the levels of debt are high relative to the uncertainty over
preferences, the short-term interest rates are higher because the incentive to roll over large
amounts of maturing debt at a lower-than-expected rate is greater. As a result of the fact
that the debt maturity does not aÆect the forward rate, these countries face a flatter yield
curve.
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Table 3: GMM Estimation Results
Variable I(a) I(b) II(a) II(b)
lag dependent 0.58*** 0.84*** 0.61*** 0.61***
(0.12) (0.08) (0.02) (0.02)
sstdebt -1.29** 0.10** 2.31* -0.55***
(0.54) (0.04) (1.24) (0.08)
debtgdp 0.03 0.04 -1.20** -1.98
(0.37) (0.05) (0.58) (1.55)
resgdp -0.27 -0.29 3.83*** 7.58*
(0.41) (0.25) (0.47) (3.94)
cabalgdp -0.61 -0.91** 2.03 7.06***
(0.54) (0.42) (1.21) (1.46)
qmongdp -0.04** -0.06 -0.02 0.90***
(0.01) (0.04) (0.09) (0.07)
N 122 123 79 51
Panels 4 4 3 2
Notes: Panels are unbalanced. The dependent variable in regressions I(a) and I(b) is the (short-term) interest rate
diÆerential with the US; in regressions II(a) and II(b) it is the domestic long-term government yield divided by
the domestic short-term rate. (a) denotes signalling countries and (b) denotes debt burden countries. Parameters
with ‘***’ are significant at the 1% level, ‘**’ at the 5% level and ‘*’ at the 10% level. Estimators are one-step
GMM estimators, with p-values based on their asymptotic heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors (reported
in parentheses). The transformation applied is the first diÆerence of the level equations.
Results of the estimations are reported in the last two columns of Table 3. We have kept
the methodology and RHS the same as in the previous estimations. With the qualification
that the sample size reduces substantially due to lack of su±cient data on long-term
yields, it appears that a shorter maturity of debt steepens the yield curve of the signalling
countries, whereas it flattens the yield curve of the debt burden countries, both eÆects
consistent with the theory. The sign of the debt ratio is negative, which implies that
the long term eÆect of increased indebtedness is to increase the long rates. However, this
eÆect is only significant for the signalling countries. The rest of the control variables do not
feature in the theoretical model so interpreting their eÆects should be done with caution.
Assuming that changes in the current account balance and the level of reserves only aÆect
short rates, the results are as expected. The results regarding the eÆect of qmongdp are
more ambivalent, with the significant coe±cient in the debt burden regression having an
incorrect sign.
As a further check, we included in all four regressions a variable capturing the size
of devaluation. This was created by interacting a dummy variable capturing the crisis
incidents in the sample with a variable measuring the percent change in the exchange rate
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over time. The estimated coe±cient of this variable was insignificant in all regressions
with the exception of I(b): in the debt burden group, the size of devaluation is positively
associated with the probability of a current crisis. The rest of the estimated parameters
(including sstdebt) retain their significance and magnitude of eÆects in all estimations
and, hence, the empirical results reported in Table 3 are robust to the inclusion of the size
of devaluation. However, the significance of the size parameter in one of the equations
should serve as a stimulus for further research on the theoretical conjecture of fixed size
devaluations.
At this point it would be useful to raise a caveat: the categorization of a country as
signalling or debt burden following a given crisis incident cannot be thought of as being
permanent. After all, policymakers and their policies change and subsequent episodes may
have diÆerent eÆects. This line of thinking would be consistent with a diÆerent approach,
where instead of classifying countries one would need to classify episodes. Intuitively,
however, this would not make a diÆerence in our dataset, as most countries only experience
one crisis incident; for those countries facing more than one crisis incidents the eÆects are
not in conflict with each other and consistent categorization is facilitated. This may not
be the case with larger datasets.
A final limitation of the empirical analysis is that it does not allow for the eÆects
of a successful (or unsuccessful) defence on policymakers’ attitudes towards structural
reforms. These reforms could be limited to the fiscal side (in an eÆort to induce debt
sustainability) or include broader supply-side changes to stimulate output and increase
revenues. If structural reforms are indeed implemented as a result of exposure to currency
crises then the equations in table 3 may be misspecified. However, there is not conclusive
evidence available about the extent and eÆectiveness of such reforms and their role in
limiting future devaluations. We leave this interesting issue for future research.
Summarizing, the econometric analysis has provided evidence of support for proposi-
tions 6 and 7. In the next section, we oÆer some concluding remarks.
5 Conclusions
As shown in Benigno and Missale (2004) whether a future devaluation is more likely follow-
ing a successful defence of the parity is uncertain and depends on the relative importance
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of the eÆects on the government’s reputation (‘signalling’ eÆects) vis-a-vis the eÆects on
the real value of public debt (‘fundamental’ eÆects). In this paper we revisit BM’s results
and adopt a more general framework that allows us to distinguish between commitment
and discretionary optimal escape clauses.
We then define an empirical framework in which the main predictions of the theory are
tested. More specifically, we examine the hypothesis that the share of short-term debt has
diÆerent eÆects on the probability of a currency crisis depending on whether signalling or
fundamental eÆects are dominant. A related hypothesis concerning the eÆect of the share
of short-term debt on the slope of the yield curve is also tested. GMM estimation of a
dynamic panel specification provides substantial evidence in support of the predictions of
the theory.
The lack of data, especially in relation to debt, has limited the country coverage of the
empirical analysis. But even though the tests in the paper are far from comprehensive, they
do constitute a first step in the direction of understanding the tension between signalling
and debt eÆects in the real world.
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A Proofs
Proposition 1: Let f(u) be the probability density function for the disturbance ut, t =
1, 2 in (1) and (4). Then the probability, at the beginning of period 1, of a second-period
devaluation is given by
Ω2(h) = Pr[u2 > uˆ2(h)] =
Z 1
uˆ2(h)
f(u)du (A-1)
where uˆ2(h) is a threshold value such that if u2 > uˆ2(h) devaluation occurs in period 2.
As before, the index h = D,F indicates that the authority devalued or maintained the
fixed parity in period 1. We assume that the shock u2 is uniformly distributed over the
interval [°v, v], then f(u) = 12v . So we can rewrite (A-1) as
Ω2(h) =
v ° uˆ2(h)
2v
(A-2)
where uˆ2(h) 2 [°v, v]. Similarly the probability of a devaluation in period 1 is
Ω1 =
v ° uˆ1
2v
(A-3)
If the bounds for the shocks are large then Ω1, Ω2(h) 2 [0, 1] is ensured. In fact in what
follows we assume that 2v > dm which (recalling m ¥ Æ+ µB and S ¥ Æ+ µB10) implies
that 2v > dS.
The expected inflation in period 2 formed in period 1 is now
E1º2(h) = dΩ2(h) + 0£ (1° Ω2(h)) = dΩ2(h) (A-4)
Using backward induction, we can then obtain the expectation of inflation in periods 2
and 1 formed at in period 0:
E0º2 = Ω1E1º2(D) + (1° Ω1)E1º2(F ) = [Ω1Ω2(D) + (1° Ω1)Ω2(F )]d (A-5)
E0º1 = Ω1d (A-6)
The expected inflation rates (E0º1 , E0º2) are then a measure of the yield curve over
the 2 periods. Integrating L2(h) = µº22 + [y2(h)° y§]2 over the interval [°v, v] and using
(A-3), we can evaluate the expected loss E1L2(h) in period 2, h = D,F , as
E1L2(h) =
1
2v
(Z uˆ2(h)
°v
(y2 ° y§)2 du2 +
Z v
uˆ2(h)
[µd2 + (y2 ° y§)2] du2
)
(A-7)
because º2 = 0 if h = F , and º2 = d if h = D. This expectation in period 1 is formed
knowing the history h = D,F , but not yet knowing the realization of the shock u2.
After considerable algebra we obtain from (A-7):
E1L2(h) =
v2
3
+ [¶(h)]2 + dΩ2(h)[µd+ 2m¶(h) + 2mv(Ω2(h)° 1) + dm2] (A-8)
where ¶(h) = °mE0º2 + (º1(h)° E0º1)B ° (E1º2(h)° E0º2)S °K, which depends on
25
the history h = D,F at the end of period 1. We can now rewrite (4) as
y2 ° y§ = mº2 +¶(h)° u2 (A-9)
In period 0, the expected welfare loss for the first period is
E0L1 =
1
2v
ΩZ uˆ1
°v
(y1 ° y§)2 du1 +
Z v
uˆ1
[µd2 + (y1 ° y§)2] du1
æ
(A-10)
Let £ = °ÆE0º1 ° k = °ÆΩ1d ° k. Then y1 = y§ + Æ(º1 ° E0º1) ° k ° u1 =
y§ + Æº1 +£° u1. Then using (A-8), we can rewrite E0L1 as
E0L1 =
v3
3
+£2 + dΩ1[µd+ 2vÆ(Ω1 ° 1) + 2Æ£+ Æ2d] (A-11)
Note that E0L2(h) = E0(E1L2(h)) = E1L2(h), since L2(h) is independent of the first-
period shock u1 that is the only random variable in period 1.
Substituting from (A-4) – (A-6) and noting that m = Æ + µB = Æ + µ(B20 + B10),
S = Æ+ µB10, we arrive at
¶(F ) = °µB20(Ω1Ω2(D) + (1° Ω1)Ω2(F ))d° Ω1dµB ° Ω2(F )dS °K (A-12)
¶(D) = °µB20(Ω1Ω2(D) + (1° Ω1)Ω2(F ))d+ (1° Ω1)dµB ° Ω2(D)dS °K(A-13)
It is convenient to treat these expressions as constraints that the monetary authority
faces when it minimizes its loss function §0 with respect to its instruments Ω1, Ω2(h) in
period 0. Therefore, we form a Lagrangian:
L0 = §0 + ∏F (¶(F ) + µB20(Ω1Ω2(D) + (1° Ω1)Ω2(F ))d+ Ω1dµB + Ω2(F )dS +K)
+ ∏D(¶(D) + µB20(Ω1Ω2(D) + (1° Ω1)Ω2(F ))d° (1° Ω1)dµB + Ω2(D)dS +K)
(A-14)
Minimizing L0 with respect to Ω1, Ω2(h),¶(h), the five first-order conditions (f.o.c.) are:
@L0
@Ω1
= d[(µ + Æ2)d+ 2ÆΩ1(2v ° Æd)° 2Æv)] + Ø(E0L2(D)° E0L2(F )]
+ (∏F + ∏D)(µB20(Ω2(D)° Ω2(F )) + µB)d = 0 (A-15)
@L0
@Ω2(D)
= ØΩ1d[µd+ 2m¶(D) + 2mv(2Ω2(D)° 1) + dm2]
+ (∏F + ∏D)µB20Ω1 + ∏DdS = 0 (A-16)
@L0
@Ω2(F )
= Ø(1° Ω1)d[µd+ 2m¶(F ) + 2mv(2Ω2(F )° 1) + dm2]
+ (∏F + ∏D)µB20(1° Ω1) + ∏FdS = 0 (A-17)
@L0
@¶(D)
= 2ØΩ1(¶(D) +mdΩ2(D)) + ∏D = 0 (A-18)
@L0
@¶(F )
= 2Ø(1° Ω1)(¶(F ) +mdΩ2(F )) + ∏F = 0 (A-19)
These five equations plus (A-12) and (A-13) can now be solved for the seven variables Ω1,
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Ω2(D), Ω2(F ), ¶(D), ¶(F ), ∏D and ∏F . This is the commitment solution for the monetary
authority: in other words, in period 0 the authority commits to the ‘policy rules’ in the
form of escape clauses Ω1, Ω2(h) which are carried out in period 1 and 2.
It is of particular interest to examine the eÆect of devaluation or not in period 1 on
the probability of devaluation in period 2. Eliminating the Lagrangian multipliers from
(A-18) and (A-19) in (A-16) and (A-17) and subtracting, after a little algebra we arrive
at
Ω2(F )° Ω2(D) = dµ
2BB20
(Æ+ µB)(2v ° dS)° µB20dS (A-20)
Our condition 2v > dm ensures that (Æ + µB)(2v ° dS) ° µB20dS > 0. Thus under
commitment Ω2(F )°Ω2(D) ∏ 0 so the probability of a devaluation following a fixed parity
in period 1 is at least as big as that following a devaluation. If there is no long-term debt
B20 = 0 then debt has no eÆect of Ω2 and Ω2(F ) = Ω2(D) and as the long-term composition
of debt increases to the point where B = B20 and S ¥ Æ+ µB10 = 1 then Ω2(F )° Ω2(D)
increases to 2dB
2
2v(Æ+µB)°d(Æ+2µB) . QED
Proposition 2: Once private expectations of inflation are formed in period 0, º1 = Ω1d
where Ω1 is found from the f.o.c. above, is no longer optimal if the monetary authority
can re-optimize. Similarly, in period 2, º2(h) = Ω2(h)d is no longer optimal policy for the
authority after private sector revises their expectation of the second-period inflation where
again Ω2(h) is the commitment rule in period 2. With discretion the monetary authority
must minimize its loss function taking private expectations of inflation in all periods as
given, i.e., taking £ and ¶(h) as given. This means that the constraints (A-12) and (A-13)
do not bind; i.e., ∏F = ∏D = 0 in our original Lagrangian function (A-14).
To solve the discretionary case, we first examine the impact of a first-period devaluation
on the probability of a second-period devaluation and then go back to the first-period
problem. Putting ∏F = ∏D = 0 in our f.o.c (A-16) and (A-17) above, we arrive at
Ω2(h) =
1
2
° 1
2v
∑
µd
2m
+
dm
2
°mE0º2 + (º1 ° E0º1)B ° (E1º2(h)° E0º2)S °K
∏
(A-21)
The probability of a devaluation in period 2, Ω2(h), depends on whether the authority has
devalued in period 1, both directly through, º1, and through a revision in expectations,
E1º2(h) ° E0º2. A devaluation in period 1, i.e. º1 = d, reduces the likelihood of a
second-period devaluation as unexpected inflation reduces the real debt burden. This is
also because a downward revision in expected inflation, E1º2, and thus in the interest rate,
decreases the debt burden in the second period to the extent that the debt is short-term.
Using equation (A-21) and (A-4), we have
Ω2(D) =
1
2v ° dS [v +K + µB20E0º2 ° dµB + µBE0º1 °
µd
2m
° dm
2
] (A-22)
Ω2(F ) =
1
2v ° dS [v +K + µB20E0º2 + µBE0º1 °
µd
2m
° dm
2
] (A-23)
which leads to
Ω2(F )° Ω2(D) = dµB2v ° dS > 0 (A-24)
Thus under discretion, the probability of a second-period crisis after maintaining the
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parity, Ω2(F ), is greater than that after a devaluation, Ω2(D). Once again, it is shown
that –given complete information– a first-period devaluation always at least improves the
likelihood that the new parity will be maintained. But in the discretion case, we can now
see that Ω2(F ) is always greater than Ω2(D) no matter what the composition of debt is.
Let ¢ΩC2 and ¢ΩD2 be the diÆerence in probabilities under commitment and discretion
respectively. Then from (A-20) and (A-24) we have
¢ΩD2 °¢ΩC2 =
dµBS(2v ° dm)
(2v ° dS)[(Æ+ µB)(2v ° dS)° µB20dS] > 0 (A-25)
since by the large shock condition 2v ° dm > 0 and the numerator has been shown to be
positive. QED
Proposition 3: Now consider the authority’s choice in period 1. We can rewrite equation
(A-8) as
E1L2(h) =
v2
3
° 2vdm[Ω2(h)]2 +¶(h)2 (A-26)
substituting ∏D = ∏F = 0 into (A-15) and noting that E0L2(h) = E1L2(h), we arrive at
the following probability of a first-period devaluation:
Ω1 =
1
2Æ(2v ° Æd)d{d(2Æ(k + v)° (µ + Æ
2)d)° Ø[E1L2(D)° E1L1(F )]} (A-27)
which is equivalent to a threshold value for the first-period shock of
uˆ1 =
1
2Æd
{µid2 + Æ2d° 2Æd(E0º1 + k)° Ø[E1Li2(F )° E1Li2(D)]}
From (A-5), which still applies, (A-22) and (A-23) we have
E0º2 =
d
2v ° dm [v +K °
µd
2m
° dm
2
] (A-28)
which shows that expected inflation and thus the probability of a devaluation in period 2
do not depend on either the term structure of debt or Ω1, the probability of the first-period
devaluation. This is because the maturity of the debt aÆects both the probability of a
devaluation in period 1 and (both short- and long-term) interest rates. For given interest
rates, a shorter maturity, which increases the probability of a devaluation in period 1,
tends to reduce the likelihood of a second devaluation. However, a shorter maturity also
increases interest rates and tax distortions with oÆsetting eÆects on the probability of a
second-period devaluation.
Using (A-26), (A-27) and (A-28), the probability of a first-period devaluation is follows:
Ω1 =
1
2
+
(2Æk ° µd)(2v ° dS)2 + 4vØ(2v ° dS)µB(k +B)
2Æ(2v ° Æd)(2v ° dS)2 ° 4vØ(2v ° dm)d(µB)2 (A-29)
The probability of a devaluation decreases with its cost to the authority, µ, and increases
with distortions, chiefly, with the debt burden, B. By diÆerentiating Ω1 with respective
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to B10 while holding the total debt constant, we can get
@Ω1
@B10
= k + µB +
2v ° dm
2v ° dS (2E0º1 ° d)µB ∏ 0. (A-30)
QED
Proposition 5: Private sector beliefs now become
E0º1 = [q0ΩT1 + (1° q0)ΩW1 ]d (A-31)
E0º2 = q0d[ΩT1 Ω
T
2 (D) + (1° ΩT1 )ΩT2 (F )]
+ (1° q0)d[ΩW1 ΩW2 (D) + (1° ΩW1 )ΩW2 (F )] (A-32)
E1º2(h) = (1° q1(h))dΩW2 (h) + q1(h)dΩT2 (h) (A-33)
where the history h = [j, u1], j = D,F consists of two observations by the public, the
exchange rate change or not and the shock. We can now show
E1º2(F \ u1)° E1º2(D \ u1) = d
2
2v ° dS
∑
µB ° q1(F \ u1)(µ
T ° µW )
2m
∏
(A-34)
Then using (A-22) and (A-23), we have
Ωi2(F \ u1)° Ωi2(D \ u1) =
dµB
2v
+ [E1º2(F \ u1)° E1º2(D \ u1)] S2v
=
dµB
2v
+
d2S
2v(2v ° dS)
∑
µB ° q1(F \ u1)(µ
T ° µW )
2m
∏
(A-35)
The right-hand-side of (A-35) can be either positive or negative. On the one hand, a first-
period devaluation may diminish the likelihood of a second-period devaluation by easing
the debt burden. If a devaluation in period 1 leads to a lower interest rate than defense,
then the authority gets a second-period gain. That is because the short-term debt, µB10,
is rolled over at a lower-than-expected interest rate. This is exactly what we see in the case
of complete information. Intuitively, for the debt burden eÆect to dominate the level of
the inflation-sensitive debt must be high relative to the uncertainty about the government
type.
On the other hand, a devaluation in period 1 could send a signal of a weak authority
who heads for further devaluation and thus may lead to higher-than-expected inflation and
interest rates in period 2. In the case that the interest rate rises following a devaluation
turn the (A-35) negative, the authority expects a second-period loss from abandoning
the fixed parity. This case is relevant when the uncertainty over monetary authority
preferences is great (or the diÆerence between preferences, µT °µW is large) relative to the
level of deflatable debt, µB and a successful defense of the current exchange rate regime
sends a strong signal of the authority’s determination not to devalue, that is, when the
signaling eÆect prevails over the debt burden eÆect.
Interestingly, (A-35) shows that whether the exchange rate regime gains or loses cred-
ibility does not depend on the maturity of the debt; instead, the short-term debt, B10,
increases the diÆerence in the probabilities of a second-period devaluation, since the costs
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or benefits of first-period devaluation are magnified by the amount of debt that is rolled
over. In addition, comparing (A-24) with (A-34) we arrive at Proposition 5. QED
Proposition 6: The separating equilibrium is summarized by the following equations:
Ωi1 =
1
2Æ(2v ° Æd)d{d(2Æ(k+v)°(µ
i+Æ2)d)°Ø[Ei1L2(D)°Ei1 L1(F )]}; i =W,T (A-36)
where Ei1[·] signifies the private expectations of the monetary authority of type i.
Ei1L
i
2(h) =
v2
3
+[¶(h)]2+dΩi2(h)[µ
id+2m¶(h)+2mv(Ωi2(h)°1)+dm2] ; h = D,F (A-37)
where, as before ¶(h) = °mE0º2 + (º1(h)° E0º1)µB ° (E1º2(h)° E0º2)S °K, where
º1(D) = d and º1(F ) = 0.
Ωi2(h) =
1
2
° 1
2v
[
µid
2m
+
dm
2
+¶(h)] (A-38)
substituting (A-38) into (A-37), we can obtain
Ei1L
i
2(h) =
v2
3
+ [¶(h)]2 ° 2dmv(Ωi2(h))2 (A-39)
which replaces (A-37). From (A-32) and (A-38) we now have
E0º2 =
d
2v ° dm
∑
v +K ° (q0µ
T + (1° q0)µW )d
2m
° dm
2
∏
(A-40)
The second-period devaluation expected by the private sector in period 0 is the same as
in the case of complete information, except for the cost of devaluation, µ, now is replaced
by its expectation under asymmetric information. As before, the debt maturity does not
aÆect E0º2. We also have
E0º1 = [q0ΩT1 + (1° q0)ΩW1 ]d (A-41)
E1º2(h) = [(1° q1(h))ΩW2 (h) + q1(h)ΩT2 (h)]d (A-42)
The equilibrium is completed with the up-dating equations
q1(F ) =
(1° ΩT1 )q0
(1° ΩT1 )q0 + (1° ΩW1 )(1° q0)
(A-43)
q1(D) =
ΩT1 q0
ΩT1 q0 + ΩW1 (1° q0)
(A-44)
and q0 = 12 (uniform distribution for the prior belief of the private sector that the authority
is tough). Using Equations (A-36) to (A-44), we can solve for the likelihood of a first-period
devaluation, Ωi1, i =W,T as follows:
ΩT1 =
1
2
°
Ø¡wT
d + k +
∏
2 ° µ
T d
2
d+ ØµB¥¡° 2v °
∏
4v
; ΩW1 =
1
2
°
Ø¡wW
d + k ° ∏2 ° µ
W d
2
d+ ØµB¥¡° 2v +
∏
4v
(A-45)
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where ∏ = d4v (2v°Ø¡)(µT °µW ) ∏ 0, ¡ = 2µBvdg°Z, Z = sd
2(µT°µW )
2m(2v°dS) , w
i = k° d28v (µT +
µW ° 2µi), g = 12v°dS and ¥ = 2v°dm2v°dS ∑ 1.
The expected devaluation in period 1 is then given by
E0º1 =
d
2
+
kd° µT d22 + Ø¡wT + d∏2
2v ° d° ØµB¥¡ (A-46)
As in Benigno and Missale (2004), it is shown in (A-46) that apart from the first two
terms inside the bracket capturing the first-period eÆects, the sign of E0º1 depends on
¡ = 2µBvdg ° Z. The term 2µBvdg captures the debt burden eÆect as µB is the level
of inflation-sensitive debt, while the term Z represents the impact of the uncertainty over
authority’s preferences determined by the diÆerence, µT ° µW . Hence, the expectation
of a first-period devaluation depends on whether the debt burden or the signalling eÆect
prevails: it is smaller when there is substantial uncertainty about authority’s types whereas
it is greater when the debt level is high. Furthermore, we can show
Ei1L2(D)° Ei1L2(F ) = 2v[Ωi2(D)° Ωi2(F )][dm(Ωi2(D) + Ωi2(F )) +¶(D) +¶(F )]
= 2v[Ωi2(D)° Ωi2(F )][Ei1y2(D) + Ei1y2(F )° 2y§] (A-47)
where y2(h) is second-period output following h = D,F . Thus, the sign of the diÆerence
between the expected second-period loss from devaluation and that from parity mainte-
nance in period 1 depends on Ωi2(D)° Ωi2(F ), which in turn, depends on whether the debt
burden eÆect or the signaling eÆect dominates.
DiÆerentiating E0º1 with respective to the short-term debt B10 while holding the total
debt constant gives:
@E0º1
@B10
=
Økg¡0d+ ØBdg¥(¡+ ¡0)(E0º1 ° d2)
2v ° d° ØB¥¡ (A-48)
where ¡0 = 2Bvdg ° Z 0 < ¡ and Z 0 = vd(µT°µW )m(2v°dS) > Z. As the sign of this derivative is
determined by ¡ = 2µBvdg ° Z (¡0 = 2Bvdg ° Z 0), the eÆect of debt maturity on the
expected devaluation in the first period depends on the relative importance of debt burden
eÆect to signalling eÆect. When there is little uncertainty about the authority’s type, so
that Z = sd
2(µT°µW )
2m(2v°dS) (Z
0 = vd(µ
T°µW )
m(2v°dS) ) tends to zero, the short-term debt increases the
probability, as perceived by the private sector, of a first-period devaluation, as it does
under complete information. On the other hand, if the authority’s resolve is uncertain–
i.e., when ¡ and ¡0 are negative–the probability of a devaluation in period 1 decreases
with short-term debt, as defending the exchange rate in adverse circumstances (larger
short-term debt) sends a stronger signal of intentions. QED
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